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Exclusive:

**Top Secret U.S. Army Memo on Infiltrating
and Subverting Allies.**

CovertAction INFORMATION BULLETIN



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MESSAGE

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REPLY

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*The CovertAction Information Bulletin is available at selected bookstores around the world at \$2.00 per copy, in the U.S.; \$2.25 overseas.

CIA CHIEF EXPOSED

The new CIA Chief of Station in Jamaica is Bamboe Ave., Kingston 4. When our photographer DEAN J. ALMY JR. This was revealed by a U.S. magazine, 'COVERT ACTION INFORMATION BULLETIN' on Wednesday, July 19.

The new CIA Chief replaced by Philip Agee who was exposed by Norman Desobles who was exposed by Philip Agee during the violence of 1976.

He is an extremely senior CIA agent having served in Spain (1953-7), the Philippines (1960-1962), and Indonesia (1962-1965). Before that he worked under cover as a 'political analyst' for the army from 1951 to 1955.

STRUGGLE understands that ALMY lives at 2

Bamboe Ave., Kingston 4. When our photographer DEAN J. ALMY JR. This was revealed by a U.S. magazine, 'COVERT ACTION INFORMATION BULLETIN' on Wednesday, July 19.

The house borders directly onto a town tennis court where Prime Minister Manley is known to play tennis on Saturdays.

ALMY is the CIA Chief or that the CIA is active in Jamaica. He is reported to have claimed that ALMY has been in the service for nearly 30 years and was exposed as a CIA agent in Spain by the newspaper CAMBIO 15.

IS ANYBODY

WATCHING THEM

CIA?

By DAVID WIS

IF VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE specialists in Washington—at the White House, the CIA, the Pentagon, and on Capitol Hill—are correct, a man named John McMahon has almost nothing to do these days. McMahon is the CIA's Deputy Director for Operations.

As such, he is Jimmy Carter's Richard Helms, the man in charge of such matters as overthrowing gov-

A first-hand examination of the congressional oversight committees raises a disturbing question: Does oversee now mean overlook?

What hinders CIA from doing its job?

By Jack Maurer

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STUDY CENTER

- RAY S. CLINE
PRESIDENT
- MARTIN G. CRAMER
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
- ADVISORY BOARD
- JOHN A. BROSS
 - WILLIAM J. CASEY
 - LEO CHERNE
 - DANIEL O. GRAHAM - LT. GEN. USA (RET.)
 - LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK, JR.
 - CLARE BOOTH LUCE
 - J. WILLIAM MIDDENDORF, II
 - PAUL W. NITZE
 - WILLIAM W. QUINN - LT. GEN. USA (RET.)
 - EUGENE V. ROSTOW

Tinker, Tailor, Soldier ... CIA Mole?

By William Greider
Washington Post staff writer

It has been collected conversationally from some of the best talents in Washington, it would seem in our great any novel is unfolding in our midst, a plot of treacherous searching for its next great villain.

Perhaps it will be the next great villain.

Soviet "mole" an intelligence officer who has been working upward, high in the manner of Britain's Kim Philby, perhaps less dramatically, is there a bitter soul selling our secrets for cash?

The CIA director, Stanfield Turner, felt required recently to deny

ire, uncovers the Soviet spy who had worked his way to the head of the British counterpart of the CIA, the KGB, or not there is a mole high in the CIA he is or it has been involved in the cause of tighter security laws or raise the possibility that judges

Lives of CIA Agents Deliberately Imperiled

Remember Richard Welch? Welch was the CIA Chief of Station in Athens, Greece, who was gunned down by terrorists, who was gunned down by terrorists, who was gunned down by terrorists.



Revelaciones de ex agentes de la CIA

Acción de campañas para desestabilizar gobiernos progresistas en América Latina y la violación de los derechos humanos en la conferencia de los ministros de la CIA en Cuba, según manifestación, para la CIA. Con esta finalidad se dictarán ante los delegados una serie de conclusiones, que tendrán lugar del 2 al 4 de mayo. Por la tarde, en el teatro "Olimpico", de esta capital

Worldwide Effort Being Launched to 'Destabilize' CIA

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post staff writer

Perched just below Dupont Circle is the apparently temporary headquarters of a new

A new blow at the CIA's cover

Closer Scrutiny Of CIA Secrecy Efforts Ordered

By Allan Frank
Washington Star Staff Writer

CIA efforts in court to keep documents secret from "national security reasons" must be subject to more severe judicial scrutiny, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled yesterday in two companion cases.

The rulings yesterday in two companion cases also raise the possibility that judges

CIA Exemption Dealt a Setback In Data Snits

United Press International

The Central Intelligence Agency will be liable to judicial challenge when it claims "national security" exemptions from Freedom of Information requests, the U.S. Court of Appeals has ruled.

The court Thursday returned two disputed FOI cases to the U.S. District Court with instructions that the judges may ask the agency for more justification on why it is withholding documents under "national security" or "investigative" exemptions.

It also ruled the judges may demand to inspect the files in private if they are not satisfied by the CIA's explanation.

Purported List Of CIA Names Is Circulated

United Press International

A new edition of the anti-CIA publication Covert Action is out with another list of names of alleged agents and the locations where they are operating under diplomatic cover in nine countries.

The publication lists alleged CIA transfers, a

CIA STATION FOR CONGRESS— ATTACKING THE BULLETIN

From the moment the *CovertAction Information Bulletin* appeared last summer, the CIA and its supporters have used it as a foil for mounting new attacks against critics who would expose their crimes and personnel, charter their activities or, better yet, legislate them out of existence.

Hardly strangers to methods of domestic political manipulation and black propaganda, the "CIA's Station for Congress" (as it was once called by a disgusted Church Committee staffer), along with its selected agents of the press corps, used the strategy in 1975 of blaming the assassination of Richard Welch on *CounterSpy* magazine, thus turning Congressional investigations of their illegal clandestine activities into forums on how to protect their own people's safety, while expanding their covert operations abroad. All this was successfully pulled off, despite public horror over what the investigations had revealed: CIA involvement in secret wars and coups, murders of foreign leaders, bribery of elected officials, assassination plots with Mafia gangsters, domestic spying and drug testing, and on and on.

Since the conclusion of the ill-fated hearings of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations, with its voluminous reports documenting CIA "abuses," there has been not a single law passed to control the Machiavellian activities of any of the intelligence agencies. Toothless committees in the House and Senate have been set up to oversee secret operations, but all they have achieved—as the head of one committee admits—is a "respectable relationship" with the CIA. A reform bill, S. 2525, has been proposed and will presumably be dealt with during the next Congress, but many critics fear that it will only strengthen covert action, its passage legitimizing assassinations, coups and the like, which up till now have been—at least in name—illegal. As a counterthrust to the attempt at intelligence "chartering," friends of the CIA have introduced their own legislation, proposing drastic curbs on First Amendment rights. Dubbed the "anti-Agee" bill, S. 1578 criminalizes exposures of intelligence personnel and operations by present or former government employees—even if the activity exposed is illegal.

Why, when the Agency has clearly had the upper hand for most of the last three years, is it mobilizing all its forces for a new campaign against its opponents? The answer is that it does not have the public support or trust needed for a clear mandate to move against its critics, regardless of its opportunistic but fickle Congressional cronies.

In the aftermath of the last struggle on the Hill, massive public awareness brought about the defeat of S. 1, the indictment of Richard Helms (though he was let off with a wrist-slap), continued exposure from former employees, troublesome Freedom of Information Act lawsuits, and even some

real rumblings within the Agency, and between it and the White House, resulting in a purge of many "old guard" spies.

All this has unquestionably weakened and demoralized the CIA, and their present push undertakes not only to strengthen their forces through legislation, but also to stifle all criticism, all exposures, all dissent.

As always, they divert attention from the basic evils of their monstrous intelligence apparatus by name calling. To be against the CIA and its practices is to be a "terrorist," a "foreign agent," or a "murderer." An analysis of the campaign against the Bulletin and various allies demonstrates that it is directed, financed and coordinated by the far right (many of them former employees), and that it is aimed at winning over moderates and conservatives.

Larry McDonald and the Congressional Record

When the *CovertAction Information Bulletin* was first launched at a press conference during the XI World Festival of Youth and Students in Havana, the right wing pounced. A detailed article about the *Bulletin*, the staff, and the press conference appeared in *Information Digest*, published by John Rees. Rees, who was exposed several years ago as an undercover agent, masquerading as John Seely, infiltrated the left in New York and Washington in the early 1970s. Later he began publishing all that he had gathered, surmised or invented in his magazine, which was circulated to various law enforcement and extreme right wing organizations around the country. His wife, S. Louise Rees, *aka* Sheila O'Connor, infiltrated, among other groups, the National Lawyers Guild and the Institute for Policy Studies. For a number of years now she has been a member of the staff of Congressman Larry McDonald (R.-Ga.), the John Birch Society officer who has the distinction of being the most stridently right wing Member of Congress, and who uses the Reeses' intelligence gathering for his ubiquitous insertions in the *Congressional Record*.

Rees's piece in *Information Digest* threw together everything he had in his files on the six members of the *Bulletin* staff with a few quotes from Havana—generally inaccurate, and often attributed to the wrong person. Still it was enough to let anyone know that some members of the press at the Festival were reporting rather quickly to McDonald and the Reeses. Of course, *Information Digest* is read only by the already converted, so, as is his practice, McDonald reprinted Rees's piece in the *Congressional Record* to give it wider circulation.


The Washington Post

The *Washington Post* then joined the campaign against the *Bulletin* with an article headlined: "Worldwide Effort Being Launched to 'Destabilize' CIA." The story quoted CIA spokesperson Herbert Hetu, "This thing [the *Bulletin*] is incredible . . . unbelievable. This goes beyond whistleblowing. . . . These people are operating under the overall pretext that everything we do is wrong." In an apparent effort to harm the *Bulletin*, the *Post* article gave an incorrect publisher of the *Bulletin* and listed the office address of one of the members, causing right-wing death threats by phone and mail.

The *Post* article raised once again the Welch assassination, and concluded, not so surprisingly, by citing John Rees as the source of information about the *Bulletin* staff.

Human Events

Human Events, which bills itself as the "National Conservative Weekly," ran a front page lead story in its August 19 issue carrying these distortions even further. "Lives of CIA Agents Deliberately Imperiled," it squealed. Again, Rees's information is cited and the Welch story is the justification. Typically, none of the CIA supporters who resurrect the Welch case ever point out that after his assassination, the person appointed to replace him as Chief of Station was an officer who had already been named as CIA in both Greek and American press.



Jack Anderson's Washington Merry-Go-Round

Another major salvo against the *Bulletin* appeared in Jack Anderson's column of August 30th. In a passing reference to *CovertAction*, Anderson referred to "CIA defector Philip Agee, working with known communist agents." Apparently having discussed the matter with Admiral Turner, he stated that "CIA chief Stansfield Turner told us that Agee's publications have been 'very damaging.' Turner said that a CIA agent who has served his country anonymously 'suddenly is made public by someone like Agee and his usefulness, his career, his prospects are greatly reduced from then on through no fault of his after he has spent many years of deprivation and sacrifice.'"

Turner's concern is, perhaps, the best recommendation for the effectiveness and seriousness of the *Bulletin*. It is unfortunate that he does not make clear that the "service" to their country for which he applauds his agents consists in the main of corrupting, subverting and destabilizing other governments and officials around the world, and involves bribery, blackmail, assassination and similar activity.

Another curious aspect of Anderson's attack on the *Bulletin* is his reference to the staff as "known communist agents." This is even beneath his usual selective standards of accuracy, and is particularly ironic in that, over the past several years, the *Bulletin* staff has provided information and research, verified or refuted tips and leads, located documents, and assisted his staff in checking facts for his stories about the intelligence complex. On many occasions this information has appeared in print in his column, clothed as the results of Mr. Anderson's own tireless research.

The "Retired" Intelligence Officers

Not long ago, the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers changed its name to the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO). The change possibly rectified a real misrepresentation, because these people are hardly retired from the intelligence business, and it is an open question how many are no longer on Agency payrolls. Founded by former CIA officer and anti-Allende propagandist David Phillips, and headed since October 1977 by former CIA man, General Richard Giles Stillwell, AFIO spends much of its time lobbying bitterly against the Agency's critics, especially Philip Agee. It also provides speakers—although AFIO people have refused to debate *Bulletin* staffers—and, in general, attempts to spread the belief that the CIA is a necessary and well-meaning organization protecting the security of the United States.

The Foundations

Two new foundations have grown out of the CIA's counterattack, and led by former luminaries of the Agency, they have joined in the attack on *CovertAction*. The less sophisticated but more sensational of the two is the Security and Intelligence Fund, chaired by James Jesus Angleton, the former Chief of Counterintelligence fired in 1974 by William Colby. A rabid caricature of a cold war anti-communist, Angleton has circulated to a "carefully selected" list a "Dear Friend" letter, dated September 29, 1978. In it he seeks support for an open lobbying effort to stop what he views as a concerted attempt by "leftists" in and out of Congress, orchestrated by the KGB, to paralyze the U.S. intelligence effort. Angleton's fundraising pitch begins with an attack on the *Bulletin* and on "Dirty Work" and includes, for the benefit of recipients who might not have noticed it, the *Washington Post* article. The letter bemoans the fact that "Agee gets off scot-free" while the Justice Department "seeks to prosecute our own agents for doing their job." Angleton ignores a rather important fact—that Agee was not accused of any crime, while the FBI higher-ups for whom he laments have been indicted for serious felonies.

Angleton's paranoia, as Colby apparently recognized, knows no bounds. His thesis is that there is a monumental KGB plan to dismantle U.S. intelligence, and that half of Congress, the Justice Department, and all critics of the Agency are part of it. This theme is carried throughout the Dear Friend letter; through Edward Jay Epstein's sloppy and inaccurate book, "Legend: The World of Lee Harvey Oswald,"



SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE FUND

Suite 590, 490 South Capitol Street, Washington D.C. 20003

September 29, 1978

Dear Friend:

If we selected your name carefully enough, you share our concern and apprehension about seeing top U.S. secrets revealed by the news media, laws changed to permit terrorist groups to act freely, FBI agents prosecuted, and CIA agents exposed -- even murdered.

As unbelievable as it may seem, our own Government is discrediting and disarming our intelligence community, while -- at the same time -- it virtually refuses to act against those who have helped get our agents killed and who now boast of their efforts to get more agents killed!

For example, Philip Agee, the CIA turncoat who has been revealing the names of CIA agents around the world, wasn't prosecuted last year for secrets he published in his book, Inside the Company. Nor was he prosecuted for exposing CIA agent Richard Welch who was later assassinated on his own front doorstep in Athens.

What's more, Justice Department officials recently admitted that "legal problems" under U.S. espionage laws "may preclude taking any action" against Agee and his forthcoming book, which is said to identify hundreds of CIA agents.

Today, Agee heads up a new radical group -- operating right in our nation's capital. This group publishes the Covert Action Information Bulletin, and the avowed aim of its editors is sinister to say the least: to "destabilize" the CIA by "exposing CIA personnel and operations whenever and wherever we find them."

We've enclosed two recent articles from the Washington Post to give you the details on the developments concerning Agee and the Justice Department's refusal to act.

Bear in mind that while Agee gets off scot-free to continue his anti-intelligence activities, the Justice

much of which was built from information supplied by Angleton, and through the pages of a November 19 Washington Post article, "Tinker, Tailor, Soldier . . . CIA Mole?" They all culminate in epitomizing the paranoia of the pro-CIA campaign: CIA critics must be silenced because a Soviet "mole" has penetrated the hierarchy of the CIA and destroyed national security to such an extent that only blind obedience to the CIA Big Brother will correct the damage, and make it safe for us to sleep again untroubled.

Somewhat more subtle are the efforts of Ray S. Cline, former CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence. Cline, working out of the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University, has long directed the CSIS worldwide programs designed to give academic veneer and respectability to the ideas of hardliners in the intelligence complex on such subjects as Eurocommunism, terrorism, and, of course, criticism of intelligence "abuses." Cline's new foun-

dation (which he says is awaiting tax-exempt status), the National Intelligence Study Center, has prepared a fundraising letter which begins, "Believing that you share my deep concern over the damage that has been done to our intelligence agencies in recent years by indiscriminate criticism . . .". The pitch lists the plans and projects of NISC, including cash prizes for books, articles and other writings on "the role of American intelligence," a pledge to maintain "close contacts with academic centers, professional organizations, the Defense Intelligence School, the CIA," etc., placing a series of programs on educational TV, and the eventual "collection of oral history--views and interviews from key figures in intelligence history." The Center even plans to open an "imaginative but dignified" intelligence museum. It remains to be seen whether this spies' Madame Toussaud's will have tableaux showing the murder of Salvador Allende, the Operation Phoenix assassination program in Vietnam, the crowning of the Shah of Iran, the payoff to Italian fascists, etc.

Also coming out of the CSIS group at Georgetown is a new magazine, *Washington Quarterly*, edited by Michael Ledeen, a crypto-journalist who orchestrated CIA manipulations of the media in Chile and in Italy, along with right-wing propagandist Robert Moss, based in London. The Autumn 1978 issue carried a "CIA Round Table" in which George Bush, Ray Cline, William Colby and Richard Helms discussed the problems facing the intelligence complex, focusing especially on "legislation before the Hill still flogging the CIA for something that was long corrected." Other issues pondered by these spies were the campaign against the CIA and its KGB connections, and the necessity for unrestrained and unreported covert action, including domestic operations in the name of counterintelligence. In November the *Washington Post* reprinted this article, under the title "The War Against the CIA."

Only a few weeks later, December 3, the *Washington Star* ran yet another in this series of CIA analyses, "A Veteran's View," by Jack Maury, a CIA officer for 28 years, including eight years as Chief of Soviet Operations and five years in charge of CIA relations with Congress (Chief of Station for Congress). Maury opens by echoing Admiral Turner's lament that there is a danger that friendly foreign intelligence services will no longer collaborate with CIA because of fear of exposure through leaks. The media, Maury charges, has not recovered from its arrogance of power for having affected the "outcome of a major war and contributing to the downfall of two presidents." After a laundry list of stories documenting the "irresponsible zeal" of the media in exposing secrets, and a vicious attack on those journalists who make "instant celebrities" of former CIA employees "who were probably ideologically or emotionally unfit for the demands of the intelligence business," (in which category, incredibly, he includes James Angleton), Maury works his way around to the CIA's serious legislative pitch. He exhorts Congress to beef up the espionage laws against whistleblowers without having to go through the unnecessary difficulties of proving intent. Maury hastens to add that he is not suggesting anything as "drastic as the British Official Secrets Act or the espionage laws of most other democratic countries." He is merely proposing a bill which would make illegal anything the director of the CIA or any other intelligence agency says should be illegal—specifically revealing the identities of officers and agents or details of information collection.

The Bentsen Bill

Basically, what Maury is touting, although he wishes it went further, is S. 1578, a bill sponsored by Senator Lloyd M. Bentsen (D.-Tex.), and which is known as the anti-Agee bill. (The House counterpart is H.R. 13901, sponsored by Rep. Robert McClory (R.-Ill.). The discussion of the bills, insofar as they focus on Philip Agee and on books like *Dirty Work*, somewhat miss the point. The naming of names in books and in publications like this *Bulletin* have nothing to do with people Philip Agee may have met while in the employ of the CIA. And, of course, Louis Wolf and most of the other journalists who are engaged in this struggle to expose the CIA were never in such government employ. The exposures are

WHO'S BLOWING THE WHISTLE?

Incredibly, one of the new members of the Congressional staff of Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D.-Tex.) where the "anti-Agee bill," S. 1578, originated (see accompanying story), is Daniel S. Sullivan, former nuclear-war analyst for the CIA. What is so unusual about this new staffer, besides his former CIA position, is that while still working at Langley, Sullivan was caught red-handed passing a top-secret CIA report on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks to Senator Henry M. Jackson and another war hawk, Richard Pearle. Sullivan's apparent motivation was his belief that the Soviets deceived the US at the SALT negotiations, and presumably the CIA report he passed on alleged this among other reasons to complicate any SALT agreement. But because this top-secret material served the purpose of the US government, the CIA and the Pentagon, Sullivan's crime was not considered prosecutable, and after a slap on the wrist, he was allowed to resign because of "insubordination." Shortly thereafter, Sullivan received another security clearance to handle top-secret documents as a member of Bentsen's staff. Perhaps he was even instrumental in convincing the Senator to sponsor S. 1578, or in drafting it.

This is a clear example of selective prosecution. While Frank Snapp has been enjoined for bringing unclassified information about the CIA in Vietnam to the attention of the American people, and the Agency process-server is waiting in the wings to slap John Stockwell for his part in telling us about the illegal war in Angola, Sullivan leaks classified material, escapes prosecution, and—low and behold—surfaces in the very office where bills are drawn up to fry whistleblowers. Where is the justice?

based on research methods, applying the lessons of articles like John Marks' "How To Spot a Spook." Senator Bentsen insists that his bill is not designed to get journalists, but ignores the fact that most of what he complains about comes from investigative journalism.

To add to the paper waste of the *Congressional Record*, Senator Bentsen took the occasion of the appearance of the *Bulletin* to plug his bill and to reprint the *Washington Post* article, which itself referred to the Rees article, reprinted by Larry McDonald only days before. Senator Bentsen said: "We

have had a difficult ordeal in recent years. We have discovered abuses and we have moved to correct them. But the time has come to look to the future. We now have strong and effective oversight of our intelligence agencies. We must continue to provide a strong and effective intelligence service. . . . I believe that anyone who so recklessly threatens the safety of our agents, as Mr. Agee does, should go to jail. This kind of senseless and stupid act cannot be justified or condoned."

The pattern of argument is familiar. The first fabrication is that intelligence abuses have been corrected, whereas nothing in the public record or the many exposures justifies such a conclusion. The second part of the argument is that Congressional oversight has cured most of the problems. However, as David Wise recently pointed out in *Inquiry* magazine, Congress does more *overlooking* than *overseeing*. And finally, apropos of nothing, the argument again raises the spectre of danger to the operatives who are exposed. This is a bugaboo which will not die, despite repeated exposes of the Agency's tawdry manipulation of the Welch murder, and the generally acknowledged fact that the naming of agents by publications such as *CounterSpy*, this *Bulletin*, and similar groups around the world has not led to the physical harm of a single person. It *has*, as Senator Bentsen notes, and as Admiral Turner has conceded, limited the effectiveness of the persons exposed; which has been its purpose. Their ability to corrupt and subvert is surely diminished when case officers are named. Far too many people know how to identify CIA personnel to ever pin the blame on Agee, Marks or any other single individual.

Recent Developments

On August 16, when publicity over the *Bulletin* and over *Dirty Work* was at its height, President Carter visited the CIA and gave a brief speech praising the heroism and dedication of everyone there. He began by pointing out that "one of the most pleasant surprises that I have had as President of our country has been the quality of work done by the Central Intelligence Agency." This praise—if it was sincere—was less than prophetic. Shortly thereafter, the plug was pulled on the Somoza regime in Nicaragua and the people of Iran began to express nearly unanimous hatred for the Shah. Carter, it seems, was not aware of the extent of the discontent, for he had dined with Somoza shortly before civil war broke out, and had publicly telephoned the Shah from the Camp David meetings to express his support. Within weeks it became clear that neither regime was likely to remain in power long. This, of course, will put President Carter in a bad light as the 1980 election year rolls around. Public praise for losers is not a guarantee of reelection, and it appears that the President is rather miffed at having been misled or misinformed by his intelligence agencies. Indeed, in mid-December Carter began, for the first time, to criticize the Shah.

In an unusual scenario, Carter's criticisms of the Agency, along with rumors of a possible sacking of his classmate Turner, have begun to surface. Secret CIA assessments ("drafts" of assessments, according to CIA sources) have leaked and been quoted, and private memos from Carter to Turner, Vance and Brzezinski have been reported in detail. According to Robert C. Toth of the *Los Angeles Times*, the



CIA's mid-August assessment of the situation in Iran concluded that "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a pre-revolutionary situation." This assessment was made in spite of a CIA task force on Iran, numbering, according to *Bulletin* sources, over 60 at Langley and more than that in Teheran, the largest task force at present. Carter's handwritten memo, naturally enough, complains that he is "dissatisfied with the quality of political intelligence." Apparently the Agency was not only wrong about Nicaragua and Iran, but also failed to anticipate the revolution in Afghanistan, or the turn of events in Zimbabwe, to name some of the more widely publicized blunders. Of course, this is not the first time the CIA's analytic ability has been shown to be wanting. Much of the Pike Commission dealt with CIA failures to predict world events.

Turner's Line

Whether Admiral Turner is slated for "retirement" remains an open question, although the President must be having some second thoughts about reversing the longstanding tradition that the number *two* man in the Agency, not the number *one* man, be military. Turner is not taking the attacks on the Agency lying down—although no response to the President's memo has been made public. He recently spoke at the National Press Club in Washington, and made an extremely clever attempt to win over the press to his notions of the need for security. He analogized the CIA's desires to protect its sources and methods with *New York Times* journalist Myron Farber's—and by implication the entire press's—desires to do the same. Just as "preserving the confidentiality

but the American mythology is not as candid as Admiral Turner. On the one hand, we pretend to be in favor of self-determination around the world, and we pretend to respect the democratic institutions of other countries. In actuality, of course, the United States acts exactly as Turner says it does, by power, threat and intimidation. This is precisely what we at the *Bulletin* are against, and precisely why we do what we do. It is also why we are attacked, and why the CIA campaign, both in the media and in Congress, takes the form it does.

Conclusion

Intelligence is the collecting of information and its evaluation. Covert political action is the effort to influence events in foreign countries without the influencer being known. . . . Political action is not an intelligence activity, but since 1947 whenever this country has authorized political action it has been assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency to carry out. . . . And so, let's not kid ourselves. All of our diplomacy; all of our economic power and pressure; all of our military threat is here to influence other countries to make sure they don't do things inimical to us. Covert action is another tool in that quiver of arrows.

It should be clear that we view the attacks upon us, and the general counter-offensive of the CIA and its allies, as an indication of the success of our work, as something of a compliment. We have not been attacked for the inaccuracy of what we print. We have not been attacked on the grounds that the Agency does not do the things we say it does, or that those things are not done by the people we say do them. We are attacked by those who believe, as does Admiral Turner, that it is correct for this government to be one which operates by fear, intimidation and violence around the world.

This is the dispute.

His argument is a fairly simple one: because we openly influence other countries, we should just as legitimately be able to secretly influence other countries. We do, of course,

 $-ER$

Will the Justice Department attempt to suppress publication of former CIA

Dirty work, de CIA in zijn blootje

Een professor van de universiteit van West Virginia plicht de studenten die bij hem de werking van de regering bestudeerden voor te houden: „Staatsgeheimen bestaan niet. Het boek kan ze allemaal vinden in de goede bibliotheek. Het boek „Dirty work“, de CIA in Western Europe“ gaat hem gelijk. Het is samengesteld door Philip Agee en Louis Wolf en bestaat voor de helft uit een lijst van 800 namen van CIA-agenten in West-Europa. Niet alleen de namen, ook de geboortedatum, het huisdadres en de telefoonnummer.

DIRTY WORLD

of anti-CIA campaigns, provide a how-to guide for exposing agents' identities, probe the facts of the Welch affair, analyze the CIA's economic missions particularly in Western Europe and offer an assessment of the agency's current structure and the continuing effort to hinder its effectiveness.

The KIQs quoted in "Dirty Work" show the government's emphasis on obtaining information and analyses of economic trends and strategies in Western Europe and throughout the world. Particular KIQs center on governmental and economic

17 CIA-agenter i Sverige avslöjas i amerikansk bok

I en bok på 750 sidor — "Dirty Work", smutsigt jobb — som inom kort ligger på bokhandelsdiskarna i USA avslöjas identiteten på sjutton CIA-agenter i Sverige från 1950-talet och framåt.

Serge Kartovich (1974)
Phillip G. Lane (1977-)
David Nickerson (1972)
Ronald C. Parsons (1957)
Vaughn A. Sherman (1974-75)
James R. Skove (1973-76)
George D. Swerdlin

CIA-uppdrag i Afrika. Folket i Bild/Kulturfront inledde ett samarbete med journalisten och hellsammanvärlad.

Avslöjandet av CIA-agentens namn är ett kontroversiellt ämne i USA. I tisdags offentliggjorde ett underutskott i senaten som sysslar med underrättelseärenden en rapport med förslag om en ny stiftning. Man rekommenderar att CIA ha

och Agees bok. I maj fick bokens förläggare, Lyle Stuart i New Jersey, ett brev från CIA i vilket man utbad sig att få manuskriptet för genomläsning. Förläggarna vägrade och senare kontaktade justitieministeriet tryckeriet där boken höll på att sättas i största hemlighet.

Då det stod klart att boken äro förstärkande ministeriet utgav möjligheter att utvärdera

Spooking Spooks—The Power

Cover of the upcoming Philip
Louis Wolf book on
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agenter i Sve
1950-talet oc
Enligt boken ve
satt McCabe che

By Eliot Fremont-Smith

Hold onto your cloak! Another test of government secrecy, the right to publish, means and ends, and your and my sense of decency, discretion, loyalty, and democratic necessity is about to implore.

The latter half—nearly 400 pages of **DIRTY WORK: The CIA in Western Europe**, edited by Philip Agee and Louis Wolf, is devoted to listing, for all the world to see, the names of the men and women who have been in the field, phibetically and by country of operation, since the 1940s.

Cover of the upcoming Ph
Louis Wolf book on

now bears that the
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pinpoint 750 CIA
their stations at all it
And, because of Sar's
month, the Justice De-
now trying to ramle up
to halt publication
clement, Earnings. The
the National Committee is
its first big

New Book
Is Aimed at
Ruining CIA

Washington — (UPI) — A new edition of the CIA's "Black Book of Communism" Action is out with another list of names of alleged agents and the locations where they are operating under diplomatic cover in nine countries.

The publication lists 15 alleged recent CIA traitors.

The article by a former CIA accountant on how the agency recruits (tells) diplomats and doctors to get their hands on how to find and mask CIA agents abroad.

Covers CIA Action, published in Washington under the guidance of renegade CIA official Philip Agee — now CIA official in Italy — 1968 after he left living the intelligence life as a spy on wrecking the intelligence agency. Agee left the CIA in 1968 after 14 years in service.

In its first edition in 1968, the publication bulletin "old exposures" — "we will never stop exposing" — "we will find them."

U.S. Weighs Action on CIA Ex-Agent

By Charles R. Babcock
Washington Post Staff Writer
The Justice Department is investi-
gating whether it is possible to bring

CIA officials were upset at the time by what they considered the failure of the espionage laws to punish such disclosures. But one knowledgeable

A possible espionage charge against the publisher, perhaps for receiving classified information, also is being looked at, one official said. First that

Muck

THE MYSTERIOUS SUPPLEMENT B; STICKING IT TO THE "HOST COUNTRY"

In April 1975 a Turkish newspaper, *Baris*, carried an article about an arcane, but unclassified United States Army Field Manual: "FM 30-31, Stability Operations—Intelligence," dated January 1970. The article mentioned a mysterious Supplement B to this Manual, and hinted that future articles would discuss that Supplement. Not another word about the Manual or the Supplement appeared in *Baris*; the reporter who had written the article disappeared, and no one would talk about it.

Over the next year or two, it is alleged, Supplement B appeared in several North African capitals, a copy eventually arriving in Spain. How and why it worked its way across the Mediterranean is unclear, though its origin in Istanbul is reasonable. Through the mid-1970s Turkey was not only a major CIA communication post, but was also headquarters for eastern European NSA activities and military intelligence units of all the services. (After the overthrow of the Greek junta and the subsequent Turkish arms embargo following the *de facto* partition of Cyprus, U.S. intelligence activities in both Greece and Turkey were scaled down, but not, to be sure, eliminated. Efforts to rebuild to the earlier levels of operations have never ceased, and appear to be gaining at this time.)

In September 1978, the Madrid magazine *Triunfo* published, in Spanish, the full text of Supplement B. There was no comment from the U.S. Embassy. Shortly thereafter, articles about and excerpts from Supplement B appeared in Italy and the Netherlands. Before the first article appeared in the well-known Milan-based weekly *L'Europeo*, its respected publisher, Giovanni Valentini, received a call from a high official of the U.S. Embassy in Rome, who stated that publication of the document would be "inopportune." When *L'Europeo* was undeterred, the Embassy wrote the magazine stating that the document was a forgery, and it was hoped the magazine would "be spared the embarrassment" of publishing a document whose authenticity had been officially denied. The letter stated: "The article published in *Triunfo* assumed the existence of a 'supplement' to U.S. Army Field Manual FM 30-31, an unclassified publication. Such a supplement has never existed." The denial is significant because the Army *admits* the existence of a secret Supplement A.

A copy of the original, English-language Supplement B has been obtained by *CovertAction Information Bulletin*, and is published in full below. In order to understand and analyze it, one must understand a bit about FM 30-31 itself. The Manual, which can be found at most military libraries, is an enlightening guide to imperialist military operations. It describes in minute detail the methods of liaison with intelligence services in foreign countries where U.S. troops are stationed, so-called "host countries" (HC).

It is based on the premise that host countries are friendly to U.S. interests and must be kept that way. The greatest threat to that friendship—short of external war—is "instability," and one of the greatest causes of instability is "insurgency." Consequently, the Manual describes insurgencies, how they develop and how they grow; it assesses the vulnerabilities of insurgencies, and explains how Army intelligence operations, working with the host country intelligence agencies, can counteract those insurgencies and promote "stability," i.e., continued support for U.S. interests.

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The first paragraph of the 132-page Field Manual states: "This manual, together with its SECRET NOFORN classified supplement FM 30-31A, provides guidance on doctrine tactics, and techniques for intelligence support to U.S. Army stability operations in the internal defense environment." This is what makes the Rome Embassy denial seem so knee-jerk; to deny the existence of "a" supplement when the Army admits in a public document that there is, at least, one classified supplement, seems rather unthinking. ("NOFORN" means not for dissemination to foreigners.)

The Manual describes insurgent capabilities and vulnerabilities, and outlines intelligence requirements regarding such movements. It discusses how to work with host country intelligence services, how to plan, collect, process and disseminate

intelligence information. It also discusses intelligence training, gives examples, complete with filled-in sample notes and forms, of intelligence collection, and gives the course outline for a model intelligence training program. A good example of typical military thoroughness is the Appendix on "Insurgent Activity Indicators." Nearly a thousand separate indicators are listed, ranging from "murder and kidnapping of local government officials," (a rather good indicator that some trouble is brewing) to "increases in purchase and use of radios" (a bit less conclusive), to "appearance of questionable doctrine in the educational system" and "increase in bank robberies."

Much of the Manual is subject to ridicule as representing stereotyped cold-war paranoia. The description of "the typical Communist insurgent organization" is absurd in its precision. Party structure is "cellular." Party members belong to a "Party cell" and to a "functional cell." Party cells contain from three to seven members, one of whom is designated "cell captain." The charts are mind-boggling. They rival some of the publications of the extreme right National Caucus of Labor Committees.

But there is a falsely harmless tone to much of the Manual. It notes that "a fundamental premise of U.S. internal defense policy is that U.S. assistance will be channeled primarily through the HC structure." This is the premise which Supplement B belies. Supplement B makes abundantly clear that it is U.S. policy to work behind the backs of the host country military and intelligence agencies, indeed of prime importance to infiltrate them. The introduction notes that FM 30-31 was "limited to matters directly concerned with counterinsurgency and with joint U.S. and host country (HC) operations to secure stability." It continues, "FM 30-31B, on the other hand, considers HC agencies themselves as targets for U.S. Army intelligence."

And that is the special charm of this "Top Secret" document: while the Field Manual sets forth procedures for cooperating with host country agencies in a mutual effort to counteract local insurgencies and maintain stable regimes, the secret supplement explains that all the while the U.S. Army will be actively attempting to infiltrate the agencies they are supposedly assisting.



The candor of the supplement is refreshing: "The U.S. Army, in line with other U.S. agencies, is not committed irrevocably to the support of any particular government in the host country for a variety of reasons."

And this most chilling appraisal: "While joint counterinsurgency operations are usually and preferably conducted in the names of freedom, justice and democracy, the U.S. Government allows itself a wide range of flexibility in determining the nature of a regime deserving its full support. . . . U.S. concern for world opinion is better satisfied if

regimes enjoying U.S. support observe democratic processes, or at least maintain a democratic facade. Therefore a democratic structure is to be welcomed always subject to the essential test that it satisfies the requirements of an anti-Communist posture. If it does not satisfy those requirements, serious attention must be given to possible modifications of the structure."

So much for the noble American commitment to democracy. Chapter 3 explains just how U.S. intelligence interests should focus on host country military and police organizations, and how they should be prepared to "put pressure on groups, agencies, or, in the last resort, on the HC government itself," if any aspect of the host government appears "vulnerable." And, as the Supplement explains, "Official action is not relevant to the issues discussed in this document. But unofficial action involving clandestinity falls into the sphere of responsibility shared by U.S. Army intelligence with other U.S. agencies."

Chapter 4 pinpoints the best recruitment and infiltration targets—particularly military officers. That the recruitment of agents within host government agencies of all kinds is a task of U.S. Army intelligence is one of the shocking revelations of the Supplement. That it might assist the CIA is one thing; that it might give its opinion on likely recruits is one thing. But that it engages in this activity on its own is something else. In addition, it is in this chapter that reference to Supplement A is found. That document, it appears, provides general doctrine, guidance and directives for the recruitment of agents in general.

And recruitment and infiltration are not where it ends. Section 11 speaks of "special operations." When the host country government does not react with adequate "vigor" to the threat of subversion, U.S. Army intelligence "will convince HC governments and public opinion of the reality of the insurgent danger" by using their infiltrators to "launch violent or nonviolent actions according to the nature of the case." Where there is insufficient infiltration of the insurgent group, "it may help towards the achievement of the above ends to utilize ultra-leftist organizations." The actions contemplated, "those described in FM 30-31 as characterizing Phases II and III of insurgency," include terrorism and outright warfare.

The irony in this sanctioning of *agents provocateur* is that the host government is to be "convinced" of the "reality" by resort to false provocations. This, as we know, has been a favorite tactic of the CIA; there is no reason that military intelligence, if also in the dirty tricks business, would not use the same practices.

The last paragraph indicates the importance ascribed to archives. If HC archives are not legally accessible, "operations" to gain access are suggested.

Is The Document Genuine?

When the document was referred to in Turkey, there was no response from the U.S. When it was published in full in Spain, there was no response. When the Embassy heard that it was to be published in Italy, they informed the publisher

of a major magazine that it would be "inopportune" to do so, and when it appeared that it would nevertheless be published, the Embassy announced that the document was a forgery—in a letter which said there was "no" supplement to FM 30-31, a statement which was itself untrue.

It is hard to imagine that the document is not genuine. The format, style and classification stampings appear consistent with other military supplements, and the document is filled with authentic military phraseology. If it is a forgery, why did it not come out in 1975? If it is a forgery, why did a high Embassy official describe its publication as "inopportune?" Military intelligence veterans who have, at *CovertAction's* request, looked at the copy of the document, all say that it appears genuine. Of course, the government could declassify Supplement A. If it has nothing to do with the recruitment of agents, then the document is surely a forgery; but if it does? Regardless of the dispute, we believe, as do publishers in several other countries already, that the document is real, and that in any event our readers should see it and decide for themselves.

— WS

In the unedited document that follows we have eliminated the table of contents, and, at the bottom of each page, "Group 1, Excluded from Automatic Declassification."

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STABILITY OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE—SPECIAL FIELDS

Supplement B
to FM 30-31


Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C.
18 March 1970

Chapter 1 Introduction


This TOP SECRET classified supplement FM 30-31B, owing to its specially sensitive nature, is not a standard issue in the FM series.

FM 30-31 provided guidance on doctrine, tactics and techniques for intelligence support of U.S. Army stability operations in the internal defense environment. As it was intended for wide distribution, its contents were limited to matters directly concerned with counterinsurgency and with joint U.S. and host country (HC) operations to secure stability.


FM 30-31B, on the other hand, considers HC agencies themselves as targets for U.S. Army intelligence. It does not



Drawing/Paul Spina/LNS.



CovertAction
INFORMATION BULLETIN



CIA Headquarters
Langley, Virginia

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repeat the general intelligence guidance laid down in other documents, such as FM 30-31 and FM 30-31A. Its aim is limited to stressing the importance of HC agencies as a special field for intelligence operations and to indicating certain directions in which the procurement of information about the host country, in a manner more general than that required by straightforward counterinsurgency, may advance overall U.S. interests.

Operations in this special field are to be regarded as strictly clandestine, since the acknowledged involvement of the U.S. Army in HC affairs is restricted to the area of co-operation against insurgency or threats of insurgency. The fact that U.S. Army involvement goes deeper can in no circumstances be acknowledged.

The use of the term "HC agencies" in this supplement may be taken to mean, according to context:

- a. The HC organization for internal defense operations.
- b. The HC armed forces generally.
- c. HC agencies other than the armed forces, e.g., the police and other civilian security agencies, national and local administrative bodies, propaganda organizations.

In other words, U.S. Army intelligence has a wide-ranging role in assisting to determine the precise counterinsurgency potential of the host country in all its aspects and the relation of that potential to U.S. policy. In pursuing its more specialist military objectives, it should not neglect the wider aspects of U.S. interests wherever opportunity offers to further them.

Distribution of this supplement is strictly limited to the addressees shown on the distribution list. Its substance may be transmitted further to those selected at the discretion of the addressees as being well suited and well placed to contribute to the end in view. Whenever possible, detailed instructions issued on the basis of this supplement should be passed on verbally, with strong emphasis on the particular sensitivity of this whole field of action.

Chapter 2 Background

1. General

As indicated in FM 30-31, most recent insurgencies have taken place in developing nations or in nations newly emerged from former colonies.

U.S. involvement in these less-developed nations threatened by insurgency is part of the world-wide U.S. involvement in the struggle against Communism. Insurgency may have other than Communist origins, in tribal, racial, religious, or regional differences. But, whatever its source, the fact of insurgency offers opportunities for Communist infiltration which, in the absence of effective countermeasures, may

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
culminate in a successful Communist take-over. Therefore, the criterion determining the nature and degree of U.S. involvement is the political stance of the HC government in relation to Communism on the one hand and to U.S. interests on the other.

2. Need for Political Flexibility

The U.S. Army, in line with other U.S. agencies, is not committed irrevocably to the support of any particular government in the host country for a variety of reasons:

- a. A government enjoying U.S. support may weaken in the war against Communist or Communist-inspired insurgency through lack of will or lack of power.
- b. It may compromise itself by failing to reflect the interests of important sections of the nation.
- c. It may drift into extreme nationalistic attitudes which are incompatible with or hostile to U.S. interests.

Such factors may create a situation in which U.S. interests require changes of governmental direction enabling the host country to obtain more constructive benefit from U.S. assistance and guidance.



While joint counterinsurgency operations are usually and preferably conducted in the names of freedom, justice, and democracy, the U.S. Government allows itself a wide range of flexibility in determining the nature of a regime-deserving its full support.

Few of the less-developed nations provide fertile soil for democracy in any meaningful sense. Government influence, persuasive or brutal, is brought to bear on elections at all levels; traditions of autocratic rule are so deeply rooted that there is often little popular will to be ascertained.

Nevertheless, U.S. concern for world opinion is better satisfied if regimes enjoying U.S. support observe democratic processes, or at least maintain a democratic facade. Therefore, a democratic structure is to be welcomed always subject to the essential test that it satisfies the requirements of an anti-Communist posture. If it does not satisfy those requirements, serious attention must be given to possible modifications of the structure.

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3. Characteristic Vulnerabilities of HC Regimes

In the light of the above considerations affecting U.S. policy, attention must be drawn to certain vulnerabilities inherent in the nature of most regimes in the less-developed nations:

a. In consequence of their backwardness or recent origin

or both, the regimes against which insurgencies are directed usually suffer from restlessness and instability. Their leading political figures are often inexperienced, mutually antagonistic, and corrupt. When leaders of exceptional stature emerge, their efforts are often frustrated by government machinery ill-adapted to modern conditions and manned by inefficient and underpaid personnel.

b. These weaknesses give rise to a wide area of possible contacts between employees of government agencies and the insurgency. Having regard to the chronic instability of the regimes, the desire for reinsurance among their supporters against possible total or partial victory for the insurgency is widespread.

c. In most cases of internal conflict in the less-developed nations, both sides claim a monopoly of nationalistic purity. But the often massive scale and relatively overt character of U.S. support gives the insurgency some psychological advantage by laying the regime open to charges of puppetry. The frequent consequence is a growth of anti-American feeling among both the public in general and employees of the regime including the armed forces. Whether the armed forces are subservient to the regime or dominate it, they usually reflect its nature and share its vulnerabilities.

U.S. Army interest in the HC armed forces is not confined to a narrow professionalism; it has a much wider political import. In most new and developing nations, the armed forces play an important role in political life, and the significance of that role is enhanced whenever a regime is confronted by armed insurgency calling for military counter-measures.

Chapter 3 U.S. Army Intelligence Tasks

4. Identification of Special Targets

U.S. Army intelligence is in a position to procure information over a wide range of HC government activity. But the specialist interests of the U.S. Army require that the major part of its intelligence effort be directed towards the HC army and related HC organizations for internal defense operations.

Special intelligence targets within the HC army include the well-placed personnel of:

a. Units at national and local level with which U.S. Army intelligence is in direct working contact.

b. Units at national and local level with which U.S. Army intelligence, usually through the medium of its working contacts, can establish productive contact outside the limits of normal military activity.

c. Local units with which U.S. Army intelligence is not in contact, directly or indirectly, and which for that reason may

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
FM 30-31

B-3. The Party Committee System

a. Although all authority within a Communist insurgency movement stems from the hard core Party cellular organization, functional committees, composed of both Party and non-Party members, are required to carry out the Party's day-to-day activities. The primary organization used for this purpose is the Party Executive Committee, commonly referred to in times of insurgency as the Party Revolutionary Committee. Like the Party's cellular organization, these committees normally exist at national, interprovincial, provincial, and district levels. Below district level, clusters of cells perform their daily functional tasks under the direction of local village committees. At

national level, control is exercised by the Secretariat of Central Committee.

b. The Revolutionary Committee may develop into a highly sophisticated structure under the direction of a secretary, his assistant, and executive officer. Under these officials will function a Permanent Standing Committee, composed of perhaps four to ten persons including the secretary and his two principal officers. Subordinate to this body a number of subcommittees or sections will function, employing 20 or more individuals some of whom may be in positions of limited responsibility. This committee system, together with its specialized elements, may be conceived as the "directing organ" of the insurgency.



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be particularly vulnerable to political contamination from local insurgent sources.

d. Mobile units, such as Special Force units and Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, which operate in areas under partial or intermittent insurgent control, and which therefore may also be vulnerable to such contamination.

In addition to the HC army and its organization for internal defense operations, attention must be paid to the organization of the police.

The police generally stand closer to the local population than the army, and for that reason may be at the same time better sources of information and greater security risks. The security risks may become acute when police are drafted into the armed forces and replaced by recruits of less experience, training and ability.

U.S. Army intelligence operations directed towards the special targets listed above have several major objectives in view:

a. To guard HC army units against infiltration and influence from elements sympathetic to the insurgency or hostile to the United States.

b. To guard against the possibility of HC army personnel reinsuring their own future by developing active or passive contacts with the insurgency.

c. To reduce corruption and inefficiency with the HC army units to tolerable levels.

d. To assist in the promotion of HC officers known to be loyal to the United States.

e. To extend the same forms of protection to all HC agencies falling within the field of U.S. Army intelligence operations.

The achievement of these objectives calls for the timely recognition of vulnerabilities in HC agencies and for timely counteraction by U.S. Army intelligence.

5. Recognition of HC Vulnerabilities

The symptoms of vulnerability among HC agencies calling for investigation, identification and action by U.S. Army intelligence include:

a. Political unreliability, such as lukewarm attitudes towards the regime, sympathy with the insurgency, outright collaboration with the insurgency.

b. Anti-Americanism arising from exposure to insurgent propaganda, from friction between employees of HC and U.S. organizations at the personal or working level, or from the too obvious presence of American personnel in the role of senior partners.

c. Blood relationships linking employees of the HC gov-

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
ernment with the insurgency. It is common practice for a family deliberately to split its loyalties between the regime and the insurgency, so that whichever wins, ultimately the family will have a foot in the right camp. Blood ties are of special relevance to police units, members of which often serve in their own home districts and are therefore exposed to pressure from families and friends.

d. Corruption, which exposes the individual to pressure from insurgent elements and, when it becomes general, undermines popular confidence in the regime thus encouraging the spread of insurgency.

e. Inefficiency reaching a level at which it impedes the smooth flow of operations and thus constitutes a form of direct assistance to the enemy. It may also conceal sympathy for the insurgency; it is a well-tried form of administrative sabotage, being relatively easy to practice and relatively difficult to detect or identify as such.

6. U.S. Army Intelligence Action

U.S. Army intelligence must be prepared to recommend appropriate action in the event of symptoms of vulnerability persisting long enough to become positively damaging. Such action may include measures taken against individuals, or more general measures designed to put pressure on groups, agencies, or, in the last resort, on the HC government itself.



It is desirable that U.S. Army intelligence should obtain the active cooperation of the appropriate HC authority in pursuing punitive measures against HC citizens. But there are areas where combined action is frustrated by divergent or conflicting aims and interests, and where U.S. Army intelligence must defend the U.S. position against contrary forces at work in the host country.

This area of divergence or conflict is often entered in the matter of punitive action against individuals who may be protected by a tangle of personal, political and bureaucratic complications.

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Action designed to influence or pressurize HC agencies or the government itself presupposes a situation in which U.S. interests are at stake. Measures appropriate to a given situation may be official or unofficial.

Official action is not relevant to the issues discussed in this document. But unofficial action involving clandestinity falls into the sphere of responsibility shared by U.S. Army intelligence with other U.S. agencies.

Chapter 4 Intelligence Guidance

7. General

The success of internal stability operations undertaken by U.S. Army intelligence in the framework of internal defense depends to a considerable extent on the degree of mutual understanding between American personnel and the personnel of agencies of the host country.

However, whatever the degree of mutual understanding between U.S. personnel and their HC opposite numbers, a more reliable basis for the solution of U.S. Army intelligence problems is the availability in HC agencies of individuals with whom U.S. Army intelligence maintains agent relationships.

Therefore, the recruitment of leading members of HC agencies in the capacity of long-term agents is an important requirement.

8. Recruitment for Intelligence Purposes

For the special purposes of U.S. Army intelligence, the most important field of recruiting activity is the officer corps of the HC army. In many less-developed nations, officers of the armed forces tend to be of propertied origin, conservative by virtue of family background and education, and therefore receptive to counterinsurgency doctrine. They are of special importance as long-term prospects because they not infrequently play a decisive role in determining the course of development in some of their respective countries.

The following categories require special attention with a view to long-term recruitment:

a. Officers from families with long-standing economic and cultural associations with the United States and its allies.

b. Officers known to have received favorable impressions of U.S. military training programs, especially those who have been trained in the United States itself.

c. Officers destined for assignment to posts within the HC intelligence structure. These require special though not exclusive attention.

Standing directives to U.S. instructors at U.S. training

establishments require the study of officers mentioned in sub-paragraph 2 (b) above from the point of view of political loyalty; of their immunity from Communist ideology and their devotion to the democratic ideals of the United States. The Secret Annex to the final training report on each HC officer passing through a U.S. training program contains an assessment of his prospects and possibilities as a long-term agent of U.S. Army intelligence.

Questions of recruitment are treated in greater detail in FM 30-31A where the general doctrine governing agent intelligence (HUMINT) is stated and elaborated. The directives laid down there should be applied to recruiting operations envisaging HC government agencies.

9. Assistance from U.S. Citizens Abroad

U.S. Army intelligence must take into account potential assistance from U.S. citizens working in the host countries, both as direct sources of information and as indicators of leads for the recruitment of HC citizens, official and otherwise, as long-term intelligence agents. Such U.S. citizens include officials working for agencies other than the U.S. Army, and U.S. businessmen, as well as representatives of the mass media, operating in the host countries.

10. Penetration of the Insurgent Movement

In FM 30-31 attention was drawn to the importance of HC agencies penetrating the insurgent movement by agent means with a view to successful counteraction. It was pointed out that there was a danger of insurgent agents penetrating HC mass organizations, government agencies, police, and military intelligence units with a view to the collection of secret intelligence. Stress was also laid on the probability that lack of information from HC agencies about insurgent activities in spheres where they are known to exist may indicate that insurgent agents have successfully penetrated HC agencies and are therefore in a position to anticipate government moves.

In this connection, U.S. Army intelligence should pursue two main lines of action:

a. It should endeavor to identify agents infiltrated into the insurgency by HC agencies responsible for internal security with a view to establishing clandestine control by U.S. Army intelligence over the work of such agents. (Operational methods in such cases will depend on the conditions prevailing in each country.)

b. It should endeavor to infiltrate reliable agents into the insurgent leadership, with special emphasis on the insurgent intelligence system directed against HC agencies. It must be borne in mind that information from insurgent sources about the personnel of HC agencies might be of particular value in determining the proper conduct of U.S. Army intelligence and in suggesting timely measures to further U.S. interests.

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11. Agents on Special Operations

There may be times when HC governments show passivity or indecision in face of Communist or Communist-inspired subversion, and react with inadequate vigor to intelligence estimates transmitted by U.S. agencies. Such situations are particularly likely to arise when the insurgency seeks to achieve tactical advantage by temporarily refraining from violence, thus lulling HC authorities into a state of false security. In such cases, U.S. Army intelligence must have the means of launching special operations which will convince the HC governments and public opinion of the reality of the insurgent danger and of the necessity of counteraction.

To this end, U.S. Army intelligence should seek to penetrate the insurgency by means of agents on special assignment, with the task of forming special action groups among the more radical elements of the insurgency. When the kind of situation envisaged above arises, these groups, acting under U.S. Army intelligence control, should be used to launch violent or nonviolent actions according to the nature of the case. Such actions could include those described in FM 30-31 as characterizing Phases II and III of insurgency.

In cases where the infiltration of such agents into the insurgent leadership has not been effectively implemented, it may help towards the achievement of the above ends to utilize ultra-leftist organizations.

12. U.S. Army Intelligence Advantages

In the field of Human Intelligence (HUMINT), U.S. Army personnel enjoy the advantage of working closely at many levels with their opposite numbers in the national intelligence structure of the host country. By virtue of their generally superior training, expertise and experience, they are well qualified to get the better of any exchange arising from

such cooperation, even in dealing with HC personnel who outrank them. This close cooperation enables U.S. Army intelligence to build up a comprehensive and detailed picture of the national intelligence structure.

Mention has been made in FM 30-31 of the desirability of establishing National Internal Defense Coordination Centers (NIDCC) and Area Coordination Centers (ACC) to integrate intelligence operations, administration and logistics into a single approach to the problem of insurgency.

This recommendation was designed to improve the effectiveness of the HC counterinsurgency effort. But it may also be used to facilitate U.S. Army intelligence penetration of the HC army as a whole. U.S. personnel attached to the NIDCC and ACC are well placed to spread their attention over the whole range of HC army organization, to embrace operations, administration and logistics as well as intelligence.

The establishment of joint central archives at the NIDCC should be used to assist the procurement of intelligence about the personnel of HC agencies, and the more selective archives kept at ACC level should serve the same purpose. Where the existence of separate HC archives not officially accessible to U.S. personnel is known or suspected, careful consideration should be given to the possibility of operations to gain the desired access.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

W.C. WESTMORELAND
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:
KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, United States Army
The Adjutant General

FM 30-31B

TOP SECRET

Few of the less-developed nations provide fertile soil for democracy in any meaningful sense. Government influence, persuasive or brutal, is brought to bear on elections at all levels; traditions of autocratic rule are so deeply rooted that there is often little popular will to be ascertained.

Nevertheless, U.S. concern for world opinion is better satisfied if regimes enjoying U.S. support observe democratic processes, or at least maintain a democratic facade. Therefore, a democratic structure is to be welcomed always subject to the essential test that it satisfies the requirements of an anti-Communist posture. If it does not satisfy those requirements, serious attention must be given to possible modifications of the structure.

From F.M. 30-31 B

Bulletin Responds to Mexican Article

The October 12 issue of *El Universal*, a Mexico City newspaper, identified the CIA Chief of Station for Mexico as Lawrence Sternfield. The article, by Manuel Buendia, said that Mr. Sternfield had replaced Thomas Polgar, who had taken the post after his ignominious departure from Vietnam. The article also noted that *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe*, still listed Polgar, though failing to note that he was listed in the book as being in Mexico "as of July 1976." The article suggested that Philip Agee may have known of the replacement and published obsolete information in order to reduce CIA pressure on him.

This allegation is incorrect on several grounds, not the least of which is that the Appendix in the book was prepared by Louis Wolf, not Philip Agee. Moreover, the book made no attempt to suggest that Polgar was in Mexico in 1978. In addition, the many deportations and entry refusals which Agee has faced do not indicate any lack of Agency pressure. We publish below, for our readers, the letter which was sent to *El Universal*:

17 November 1978

The Editor
Letters Section
El Universal
Bucareli # 17
Mexico, D.F. ZP # 1
Mexico

Dear Sir or Madam:

I write in reference to the article of 12 October by Manuel Buendia, exposing the CIA Chief of Station in Mexico.

First, let me commend you for this exposure. We wish that many newspapers throughout the world would do likewise. We believe recent history demonstrates clearly that the acts of intervention and subversion by the CIA in countries around the globe can not be seen and condemned separately from the people who carry them out. Just as normal citizens engaged in lawful and honest endeavor are responsible for their actions, so also are CIA personnel.

As co-editor with Philip Agee of the book *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe*, and the person responsible for the second section of the book wherein over 700 CIA personnel are named, I wish to bring several facts to the attention of Manuel Buendia and your readers. Mr. Buendia made two erroneous statements about the book.


(1) He said that Philip Agee doesn't have up-to-date information about who was the Chief of Station in Mexico

by naming Thomas Polgar as the chief. Mr. Buendia fails to realize that the production of a book like *Dirty Work* is not the same as the production of a newspaper. It took nearly three years to prepare the Appendix to the book, and although I attempted to update information whenever possible, I had to stop sometime and allow the book to be typeset. As you will see, we referenced Mr. Polgar's stationing in Mexico stationing in Mexico "as of July 1976," although we also knew he had to leave his Chief of Station post in Saigon when final U.S. defeat became a reality on 30 April 1975. We are pleased that you discovered and exposed his transfer subsequent to 1976. If we had the information when we went to press we would have included it. In any case, the CIA does not make a point of informing us when someone is transferred.

(2) Mr. Buendia suggested that Philip Agee may have been under certain "restraints" as a result of his well-known and acknowledged commitment to expose CIA operations and personnel wherever and whenever possible. Mr. Buendia's theory then proceeds to suggest that Philip Agee was forced or chose to arrive at some kind of a compromise with the CIA, and therefore write "obsolete information that doesn't really hurt the Company." I speak both for Mr. Agee and myself when I state the obvious: there is absolutely no basis for this theory of Mr. Buendia's. Had we known of Mr. Sternfield's presence in Mexico City, we would by all means have wanted to include his name and long CIA career in the book.

It should be plainly understood that whenever CIA operations and personnel are exposed, such as Mr. Buendia has done, the Company (CIA) has to make drastic adjustments and reorganizations, and more importantly, its capability to intervene covertly in the given country's sovereign affairs is impaired. This has a definite destabilizing effect on the Agency.

We are very hopeful that the Mexican people will continue to work to expose and neutralize the programs of the CIA, so that the likes of Thomas Polgar and Lawrence Sternfield, as well as the CIA and ITT officials who, it is now revealed, paid huge bribes to certain persons in an effort to get things their way, will be forced to remove themselves from your country.



In a recent interview, former CIA Director William Colby answered the question "What do you see as the greatest threat to America today?" as follows (not the entire answer): "The overall relationship with the Third

World—three-quarters of the world is in the Third World. The most obvious threat is the fact that there are sixty million Mexicans today, and there are going to be 120 million of them by the end of the century. . . . They're becoming increasingly displeased at the gap between our affluence and their poverty. . . . We can reinforce the Border Patrol, and they don't have enough bullets to stop them all, or we can get a positive relationship with those people and help them develop their own country. . . ." That William Colby should single out Mexico as being the greatest threat to America today is one indication of how important the CIA considers your country to be in its priorities. The other large factor of which the Agency, as well as the White House, is acutely aware, is the prospect of huge oil and natural gas reserves in Mexico.

There is little doubt that in the coming years, you will be experiencing the effects of various CIA covert operations. The exposure of its operations and its personnel is a large step in the direction of hampering the Agency's designs for Mexico.

Yours Sincerely,

Louis Wolf
editorial staff member
CovertAction Information Bulletin

Australian Connection Expands

The CIA is expanding its secret spy-satellite base at Pine Gap, Australia, according to the September 18, 1978 issue of *Nation Review*, a Melbourne newsweekly. The paper reports that a sixth radar tracking dome has been built at the base, long a source of political debate in Australia.

When the project was first announced, in 1966, it was reported as a joint venture of the Australian Defense Department and the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the U.S. Department of Defense. It was to contain two radar domes, and was "purely defensive." It was not discovered until 1975 that ARPA had nothing to do with Pine Gap; the U.S. agency was the CIA. The two domes gradually increased until now there are six. Moreover, the installation is not "purely defensive," but involves the "interception of Soviet and Chinese military communications, pinpointing military targets, eavesdropping on domestic and international telephone and telex communications and providing a direct link for CIA spies, including those in China and the Soviet Union, with Agency Headquarters in Virginia."

The *Nation Review* reporter has done his homework. The article describes the location and diameters of the six radomes, and even points out an increase in the square footage of the computer room on the base. They note the date that an Air Force plane arrived at the nearby field with the construction

materials for the new dome and some replacement parts for an older one. This sort of research is to be commended.

Although the CIA and its Australian counterpart have stated that the base is essential to "both our countries and services," the article notes that neither the Australian Parliament nor people have approved this conversion of Pine Gap into a nuclear target controlled by the United States.



NAMING NAMES

Once again, we are able to expose for our readers more CIA employees serving around the world under diplomatic cover, and to update the movements of several others already named in *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe*.

Pakistan

The CIA Chief of Station in Islamabad, since at least mid-1977, is **John Joseph Reagan**, born January 18, 1929 in Massachusetts. Mr. Reagan was a "Plans Officer" with the Department of the Army from 1951 to 1958, and served at the Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia from 1959 to 1963, a period of intensive CIA involvement in covert paramilitary operations prior to the overthrow of Sukarno in 1965 and the massacre of some one million people that followed. He then served several years at the Consulate General in Hong Kong. From 1969 till some time in 1971 he was a Political Officer at the Kuala Lumpur Embassy, advancing to R-3. We have been unable to find State Department records of his assignments between late 1971 and 1977, when he appears in Pakistan, as Attache. Given his age and his high rating, it appears clear that he is the Chief of Station for Pakistan.

Brazil

One of the Agency's most experienced men in Brazil has reappeared at the Consulate General in Rio de Janeiro. **R. Martin Graves**, born July 1, 1937 in Oregon, served in some undisclosed positions with the Army from 1963 to 1966. In 1967 he was an Economic Officer in Recife; from 1968 to 1969 he was a Political Officer at the then Embassy in Rio, progressing from R-6 to R-5. In late 1969 he was transferred, still a Political Officer, to Sao Paulo. We have been unable to find records of his activities between 1972 and 1975, but as of January 1976 he appears at the Embassy in Brasilia, and, as of August 1978, returns to Rio de Janeiro. He would appear to be a mid-level case officer.

Another new discovery in Brazil is **Antonio L. Neves**, born June 15, 1931 in Massachusetts. Neves served as an analyst for the Department of the Army from 1955 to 1962, a give-away for Agency in-service training activity, before appearing at the Rio de Janeiro Embassy as an Attache with an R-6 rating. From 1966 to 1971 he was a Political Assistant at the Rome Embassy, switching rating from R-5 to S-3 (an equivalent grade), and then advancing to S-2. The switch from R to S is another indication of CIA ties. Then, in 1971 he appears as a Foreign Affairs Officer at the State Department in Washington (though perhaps actually at Langley), with a GS-14 rating. We have been unable to discover his activities between late 1971 and mid-1978, when, as of August 1978 he appears, once again, at the Rio de Janeiro

Consulate General. He is undoubtedly a high-ranking case officer there.

Lebanon

A relative newcomer to the Agency, **Hugh J. Turner III**, has been noted, at least as of early 1978, at the Beirut Embassy, as Third Secretary. Turner, born September 8, 1943 in Louisiana, served as a "research analyst" with the Department of the Army from 1972 to 1973, and received language training in Washington and in Beirut before his posting there, in March 1977.



Egypt

Even younger is **John G. O'Connell**, born January 15, 1948 in Massachusetts. O'Connell was also a "research analyst" for the Department of the Army from 1971 to 1972, and received language training in Washington in early 1973. His assignments between 1974 and 1977 are not known to us, but in March 1977 he was posted to the Cairo Embassy as Third Secretary for Economic Affairs, a post he was at as recently as March 1978.

Philippines

The person who appears to be the chief telecommunications engineer for the CIA in Manila—a major regional telecommunications station for Asia—is **Richard Schwartzbard**, born May 22, 1935. He was noted as a telecommunications engineer at Manila in early 1969, when he had a rating of

S-3, and reappeared in State Department records posted in Washington in late 1975 with the very high rating of R-2. In early 1976 through 1978 he was again documented in Manila.

Greece

Another telecommunications officer for the Agency, appearing as of late 1978 in Athens, is **Robert J. Sell**, born December 2, 1935 in Ohio. Sell is listed as a communications technician for the Department of the Army from 1963 to 1965, and appears in telecommunications posts at the Beirut Embassy from 1965 to 1968; at the Bangkok Embassy from 1968 to 1971; and at the Abidjan Embassy from 1971 to 1974.

Mexico

The Mexico City newspaper, *El Universal*, on October 12, 1978, carried a report that the former Chief of Station, Thomas Polgar, had been replaced by **Lawrence Melvin Sternfield**, 52. Sternfield was a "research analyst" with the Department of Commerce from 1951 to 1954, when he became a political officer at the Santiago, Chile, Embassy, with the rank S-7. In the late 1950s he was a political officer at the Rio de Janeiro Embassy where his rank changed from S to R, and in the middle 1960s he served at the Embassy in La Paz, Bolivia. Between 1966 and 1973, he was apparently at Headquarters in Langley, and then vanished until his posting to Mexico City in the summer of 1977.

(See *Bulletin* letter to *El Universal* on page 19.)

Transfers

New postings have been discovered for four persons whose detailed biographies appear in *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe*.

Royce L. Breaw, who was a senior telecommunications officer in Athens, appears, at least as of October 1978, in Manila, Philippines.

Edward F. Atkins, a very high-ranking case-officer, who has been with the CIA since 1951, was transferred from Rome to Paris, France, where he appears at least as of November 1978.

In what may be an inter-European switch, **Frederick Dalziel Vreeland**, who is a few years older than Atkins, the same rank, R-3, and also a twenty-seven year man with the Agency, was just transferred from Paris to Rome, Italy. If Hugh Montgomery is still in Rome, Vreeland may be Deputy Chief of Station.

Finally, **Norman A. Bernier**, a telecommunications officer who served in Chile from 1968 till at least 1971, and in Athens, from 1976 to 1978, was just recently moved to London, United Kingdom.

(As always, we urge *Bulletin* readers who discover recent movements of persons mentioned in this column to notify us as soon as possible, so that we may report on these movements.)

PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST


Some Worthwhile Periodicals

MERIP Reports, magazine of the Middle East Research and Information Project, 10 issues (one year) \$11 (plus \$4 surface postage overseas, \$10.50 air), from MERIP, P.O. Box 3122, Washington, DC 20010. (Excellent analyses of developments in Middle East; each issue usually focuses on single subject.)

Struggle, newspaper of the Workers Liberation League of Jamaica, biweekly, \$8/year, from Struggle, Box 187, Kingston 7, Jamaica. (Organ of the Marxist WLL, with hard to find analyses of political developments in Jamaica.)

Dimension, \$10/year (plus postage: U.S., \$1; other, \$2.50 surface, \$5.50 air), from Canadian Dimension, 801-44 Princess St., Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada R3B 1K2. (Excellent independent left magazine from Canada, with considerable emphasis on intelligence issues.)

Tapol, newsletters of the Campaigns for the Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners. U.S. Bulletin, \$5/year, from Tapol USA, P.O. Box 609, Montclair, NJ 07042. British Bulletin, £3 (£4 overseas)/year, from Tapol, 8a Treport St., London SW18 2BP, England. (Comprehensive coverage of situation in Indonesia, East Timor, and region.)



DIRTY WORK

The CIA In Western Europe

Edited by Philip Agee and
Louis Wolf

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NEWS NOTES

Was It Really Paisley?

When the body of former CIA analyst, and present CIA "consultant" John A. Paisley was found in Chesapeake Bay October 1, with a bullet wound in his head, the questions which circulated centered on one issue: was he murdered or did he commit suicide? It now appears that the mystery is more fundamental: was it Paisley?

Nearly two months after the recovery of the body, the widow, Maryann Paisley, has retained a private investigator, and Washington attorney Bernard Fensterwald, to pursue her astonishing assertion that the body found was not her husband's. Mrs. Paisley confided that the CIA had persuaded her, right after the body was found, to have it cremated. She and her attorney now assert that the body found in the bay did not match her husband's height or weight or measurements. They also claim that various death records of the Maryland authorities have been altered to cover-up evidence of the discrepancies in vital statistics.

A.I.D. Studies Carolina Town

Thanks to a North Carolina subscriber we have been shown one of the more bizarre aspects of A.I.D. operations. According to the November 27, 1978, *Laurinburg Exchange*, the Agency for International Development has announced that it is going to study Scotland County, North Carolina, "to learn from Scotland so that they might copy its successes overseas." A 25-member team of A.I.D. specialists will spend twelve weeks at the job. What is so ironic is that Scotland County is the poorest county in North Carolina. What is more understandable is that the county is almost entirely unorganized, and has a history of some of the more "imagin-

ative" anti-union activities in this most anti-union state. The Chamber of Commerce Newsletter had to be taken to court for publishing a list of car descriptions and license plate numbers of union organizers. As one of the A.I.D. specialists put it, "I think Scotland has a story to share and I think it is worth spending time to learn."

Considering the form in which A.I.D. imparts U.S. repressive technology to other nations, they might well study the system of criminal justice in North Carolina, probably the worst in the United States. Many of A.I.D.'s client governments have their own Wilmington Tens and their own Rev. Ben Chavises languishing in their jails.

Deputy Director on Assassinations

CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci recently testified on capital punishment for presidential assassinations. In the course of his testimony he ranged from the fatuous to the unintentionally ironic. As reported in the December 12 *Washington Post*, he said that "by far the most important thing CIA can do in the sordid business of assassinations is to help prevent them." He said he could not go into details, but he assured the committee that "there are public figures alive in this world today who have CIA to thank for it."

Indeed. Like the Shah of Iran and General Pinochet. Carlucci neglects to point out that there are far more public figures dead today who have the CIA to thank for it.

(Continued on page 19)

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